Author: David J. Chalmers Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0199826617 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 626
Book Description
In this book David Chalmers follows up and extends his thoughts and arguments on the nature of consciousness that he first set forth in his groundbreaking 1996 book, The Conscious Mind.
Author: David J. Chalmers Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0199718652 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 625
Book Description
In this book David Chalmers follows up and extends his thoughts and arguments on the nature of consciousness that he first set forth in his groundbreaking 1996 book, The Conscious Mind.
Author: Charles Siewert Publisher: Princeton University Press ISBN: 1400822726 Category : Psychology Languages : en Pages : 385
Book Description
Charles Siewert presents a distinctive approach to consciousness that emphasizes our first-person knowledge of experience and argues that we should grant consciousness, understood in this way, a central place in our conception of mind and intentionality. Written in an engaging manner that makes its recently controversial topic accessible to the thoughtful general reader, this book challenges theories that equate consciousness with a functional role or with the mere availability of sensory information to cognitive capacities. Siewert argues that the notion of phenomenal consciousness, slighted in some recent theories, can be made evident by noting our reliance on first-person knowledge and by considering, from the subject's point of view, the difference between having and lacking certain kinds of experience. This contrast is clarified by careful attention to cases, both actual and hypothetical, indicated by research on brain-damaged patients' ability to discriminate visually without conscious visual experience--what has become known as "blindsight." In addition, Siewert convincingly defends such approaches against objections that they make an illegitimate appeal to "introspection." Experiences that are conscious in Siewert's sense differ from each other in ways that only what is conscious can--in phenomenal character--and having this character gives them intentionality. In Siewert's view, consciousness is involved not only in the intentionality of sense experience and imagery, but in that of nonimagistic ways of thinking as well. Consciousness is pervasively bound up with intelligent perception and conceptual thought: it is not mere sensation or "raw feel." Having thus understood consciousness, we can better recognize how, for many of us, it possesses such deep intrinsic value that life without it would be little or no better than death.
Author: Eric Schwitzgebel Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 0262295083 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 238
Book Description
A philosopher argues that we know little about our own inner lives. Do you dream in color? If you answer Yes, how can you be sure? Before you recount your vivid memory of a dream featuring all the colors of the rainbow, consider that in the 1950s researchers found that most people reported dreaming in black and white. In the 1960s, when most movies were in color and more people had color television sets, the vast majority of reported dreams contained color. The most likely explanation for this, according to the philosopher Eric Schwitzgebel, is not that exposure to black-and-white media made people misremember their dreams. It is that we simply don't know whether or not we dream in color. In Perplexities of Consciousness, Schwitzgebel examines various aspects of inner life (dreams, mental imagery, emotions, and other subjective phenomena) and argues that we know very little about our stream of conscious experience. Drawing broadly from historical and recent philosophy and psychology to examine such topics as visual perspective, and the unreliability of introspection, Schwitzgebel finds us singularly inept in our judgments about conscious experience.
Author: Gregg Rosenberg Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0195168143 Category : Language Arts & Disciplines Languages : en Pages : 344
Book Description
"Rosenberg introduces a new paradigm called Liberal Naturalism for thinking about what causation is, about the natural world, and about how to create a detailed model to go along with the new paradigm. Arguing that experience is part of the categorical foundations of causality, he shows that within this new paradigm there is a place for something essentially like consciousness in all its traditional mysterious respects."--BOOK JACKET.
Author: Robert A. Berezin Publisher: Wheatmark, Inc. ISBN: 1604949414 Category : Psychology Languages : en Pages : 287
Book Description
"Robert Berezin holds that contemporary psychiatry has fallen under the sway of biological reductionism, where our patients do not receive proper care. They are treated primarily or exclusively with psychoactive drugs. Pharmaceutical psychiatry ignores the complexities of the human condition as if the agency of human suffering can be cured by a pill. In Psychotherapy of Character, Dr. Berezin presents an alternative to the prevailing doctrine, one that is grounded in an understanding of human nature. Suffering is not a brain problem, it is a human problem. He illuminates the practice and effectiveness of psychotherapy through the story of his patient, Eddie. Eddie's complicated inner life, varied experiences, and ultimate breakthrough, stand in contrast to the destructive and false promises of a magical cure."--
Author: Declan Smithies Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0199917671 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 457
Book Description
What is the role of consciousness in our mental lives? Declan Smithies argues here that consciousness is essential to explaining how we can acquire knowledge and justified belief about ourselves and the world around us. On this view, unconscious beings cannot form justified beliefs and so they cannot know anything at all. Consciousness is the ultimate basis of all knowledge and epistemic justification. Smithies builds a sustained argument for the epistemic role of phenomenal consciousness which draws on a range of considerations in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. His position combines two key claims. The first is phenomenal mentalism, which says that epistemic justification is determined by the phenomenally individuated facts about your mental states. The second is accessibilism, which says that epistemic justification is luminously accessible in the sense that you're always in a position to know which beliefs you have epistemic justification to hold. Smithies integrates these two claims into a unified theory of epistemic justification, which he calls phenomenal accessibilism. The book is divided into two parts, which converge on this theory of epistemic justification from opposite directions. Part 1 argues from the bottom up by drawing on considerations in the philosophy of mind about the role of consciousness in mental representation, perception, cognition, and introspection. Part 2 argues from the top down by arguing from general principles in epistemology about the nature of epistemic justification. These mutually reinforcing arguments form the basis for a unified theory of the epistemic role of phenomenal consciousness, one that bridges the gap between epistemology and philosophy of mind.
Author: Mark Rowlands Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 113943098X Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 257
Book Description
In The Nature of Consciousness, Mark Rowlands develops an innovative account of the nature of phenomenal consciousness, one that has significant consequences for attempts to find a place for it in the natural order. The most significant feature of consciousness is its dual nature: consciousness can be both the directing of awareness and that upon which awareness is directed. Rowlands offers a clear and philosophically insightful discussion of the main positions in this fast-moving debate, and argues that the phenomenal aspects of conscious experience are aspects that exist only in the directing of experience towards non-phenomenal objects, a theory that undermines reductive attempts to explain consciousness in terms of what is not conscious. His book will be of interest to a wide range of readers in the philosophy of mind and language, psychology and cognitive science.
Author: Daniel C. Dennett Publisher: Hachette+ORM ISBN: 0316439487 Category : Science Languages : en Pages : 707
Book Description
Daniel Dennett's "brilliant" exploration of human consciousness — named one of the ten best books of the year by the New York Times — is a masterpiece beloved by both scientific experts and general readers (New York Times Book Review). Consciousness Explained is a full-scale exploration of human consciousness. In this landmark book, Daniel Dennett refutes the traditional, commonsense theory of consciousness and presents a new model, based on a wealth of information from the fields of neuroscience, psychology, and artificial intelligence. Our current theories about conscious life — of people, animal, even robots — are transformed by the new perspectives found in this book. "Dennett is a witty and gifted scientific raconteur, and the book is full of fascinating information about humans, animals, and machines. The result is highly digestible and a useful tour of the field." —Wall Street Journal
Author: Uriah Kriegel Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0190273240 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 296
Book Description
Recent work on consciousness has featured a number of debates on the existence and character of controversial types of phenomenal experience. Perhaps the best-known is the debate over the existence of a sui generis, irreducible cognitive phenomenology, a phenomenology proper to thought. Another concerns the existence of a sui generis phenomenology of agency. Such debates bring up a more general question: how many types of sui generis, irreducible, basic, primitive phenomenology do we have to posit to just be able to describe the stream of consciousness? This book offers a first general attempt to answer this question in contemporary philosophy. It develops a unified framework for systematically addressing this question and applies it to six controversial types of phenomenal experience, namely, those associated with thought and judgment, will and agency, pure apprehension, emotion, moral thought and experience, and the experience of freedom.
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Author: David J. Chalmers
Author: David J. Chalmers
Author: Charles Siewert
Author: Eric Schwitzgebel
Author: Gregg Rosenberg
Author: Robert A. Berezin
Author: Declan Smithies
Author: Mark Rowlands
Author: Daniel C. Dennett
Author: Uriah Kriegel